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Memory phenomena associated with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) have received 
increased attention in the recent literature.  Some debate remains about whether OCD is 
characterized by deficits in memory per se, or by poor memory confidence.  Following from a 
recent study that demonstrated memory distrust results from repeated checking of a virtual 
computerized stove, we asked 50 undergraduate students to repeatedly turn on, turn off and 
check either a real kitchen stove (relevant checking) or a real kitchen faucet (irrelevant checking) 
in a standardized, ritualized manner.  All participants completed a final check of the stove 
following these 19 checking trials.  Results indicated that following repeated relevant checking, 
participants reported significantly reduced memory confidence, vividness and detail.  Repeated 
irrelevant checking did not produce these decreases.  Results are discussed in terms of cognitive-




Repeated checking really does cause memory distrust 
 
Recent cognitive-behavioural models of compulsive checking (Rachman, 2002; 
Salkovskis, 1999) have emphasized the influence of certain beliefs (e.g., inflated responsibility) 
on compulsive symptomatology.  While concepts such as inflated responsibility, overestimation 
of threat and intolerance of uncertainty certainly play key roles in the phenomenology of OCD 
(Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group, OCCWG, 1997, 2001, 2003), there is now a 
growing emphasis on other forms of cognition (i.e., attention, memory, metamemory) associated 
with OCD.  Unfortunately, much of this work lacks ecological validity or the specificity required 
to elucidate the cognitive phenomena of interest (Radomsky & Rachman, 2004). 
Recent ecologically valid investigations of memory confidence in association with OCD 
have been both provocative and informative.  Tolin et al. (2001) conducted a study in which 
participants were asked to repeatedly recall groups of threat relevant and irrelevant objects.  
They found that while memory accuracy was not affected by this repetition, memory confidence 
decreased significantly over time.  That is, repeated recollection resulted in diminished 
metamemory but had no detectable effects on memory itself.  
In a study that was primarily an investigation of memory bias in association with 
compulsive checking, Radomsky, Rachman & Hammond (2001) asked participants to complete 
checks of potentially threatening items in their homes under conditions of high, low and no 
responsibility and found a significant relationship between increased levels of responsibility and 
decreased confidence in memory.  That is, as responsibility increased, memory confidence 
declined.  Interestingly, these reductions in memory confidence were associated with increases in 
memory accuracy for threat-relevant information, suggesting that while threatening information 
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may be better remembered by compulsive checkers, this positive memory bias may occur at the 
cost of a vivid, detailed and trusted memory. 
More recently, van den Hout & Kindt (2003, 2004) conducted a series of novel and 
elegant investigations attempting to elucidate the mechanism(s) responsible for decreased 
memory confidence in association with compulsive checking.  In their research, van den Hout & 
Kindt used a paradigm in which participants were asked to operate the gas rings on a virtual 
stove and to operate dimmer switches for virtual light bulbs.  Specifically, participants were 
trained to use a computer program to operate simulated gas rings and light bulbs.  While their 
experiments consisted of a number of variations, generally, one group of participants was asked 
to repeatedly check one set of items (i.e., the knobs on the stove) in what the authors termed 
“relevant checking”, while another group was asked to repeatedly check the other set (i.e., the 
dimmer switches) in what the authors termed “irrelevant checking”.  Following these repeated 
checking trials, all participants were asked to complete one final check of the same set of items 
(i.e., the knobs on the stove) and were then asked a number of questions about their memory 
accuracy and metamemory (memory confidence, vividness and detail) for the most recent 
checking trial. 
Results from their investigations revealed that non-clinical individuals who engaged in 
repeated relevant checking showed marked decreases in memory confidence, vividness and 
detail (van den Hout & Kindt, 2003, 2004).  In addition, these participants tended to shift from 
‘remembering’ their most recent check at pre-test to simply ‘knowing’ that they had checked the 
relevant item at post-test.  This change, based on a distinction made by Tulving (1985), shows 
that the source or overall quality of the memory had changed from something more episodic (i.e., 
‘remembering’) to something more semantic (i.e., ‘knowing’).  Finally, van den Hout & Kindt 
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(2003, 2004) found no evidence of decreases in memory accuracy following repeated relevant 
checking and no evidence of decreases in metamemory variables following repeated irrelevant 
checking.  Van den Hout and Kindt (2003, 2004) argued that while responsibility and other 
factors may lead someone to begin checking, it was the repetition involved that produced a shift 
from primarily perceptual processing to processing of a conceptual nature.  This in turn led to 
reduced confidence, vividness and detail of memory, leaving accuracy unimpaired.  These 
changes would likely produce increased urges to check and it was therefore proposed that 
checking leads to memory distrust, which leads to increased checking. 
The findings of these elegant experimental investigations are consistent with a recently 
proposed cognitive model of compulsive checking (Rachman, 2002) in which it was proposed 
that inflated responsibility, perceived severity of harm and perceived probability of harm interact 
to produce checking behaviour, which is then maintained by a “self-perpetuating mechanism”.  
While the studies by van den Hout & Kindt (2003, 2004) described above certainly indicate that 
checking may well contribute to its own self-perpetuation, their protocols utilized ‘virtual’ 
objects and therefore did not involve any perceived threat resulting from participants’ poor 
performance.  Furthermore, while participants were responsible for their own performance 
during their checking of virtual gas rings and virtual light bulbs, there was likely little sense of 
responsibility for the prevention of harm in their investigations.  Responsibility and threat 
estimation are two of the primary belief domains established by the Obsessive Compulsive 
Cognitions Working Group (OCCWG, 1997, 2001, 2003), and collectively account for more of 
the variance in OCD related beliefs than any other identified belief domain (OCCWG, in press).  
The studies of van den Hout & Kindt (2003, 2004) would therefore likely benefit from 
replication and extension to include these key constructs of interest. 
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Due to some of the limitations in previous work investigating aspects of cognition in 
clinical populations, an experimental study using a highly ecologically valid protocol is desirable 
(Radomsky & Rachman, 2004).  The limitations of previous studies can generally be 
characterized by low ecological validity, either because words were used as stimuli, or because 
the experimental protocols did not produce conditions in which the participants perceived their 
performance as meaningful and/or important.  One way to build upon the extant work on 
repetition and metamemory, adding aspects associated with responsibility and threat perception, 
while also improving upon the ecological validity of a virtual checking task would be to conduct 
an experimental investigation of task repetition, memory and memory confidence in an 
environment conducive to perceived threats, such as a functioning kitchen.  The current study 
attempts to achieve these goals under conditions that should promote both increased 
responsibility and a real perceived threat.  It is expected that, under these conditions, repeated 
relevant checking should lead to reductions in memory confidence, vividness and detail, while 
repeated irrelevant checking should not.  Based on previous findings (van den Hout & Kindt, 





 Participants completed the Vancouver Obsessional Compulsive Inventory (VOCI: 
Thordarson, Radomsky, Rachman, Shafran, Sawchuk, & Hakstian, 2004), the Beck Anxiety 
Inventory (BAI: Beck, & Steer, 1990), and the Beck Depression Inventory II (BDI: Beck, Steer, 
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& Garbin, 1996).  All of these measures have been shown to have acceptable psychometric 
properties. 
 
Memory Accuracy.  At both pre- and post- tests (see below) participants were given a diagram 
showing the six knobs on the stove.  They were asked to mark three X’s to indicate which three 
knobs they checked during the most recent trial. 
 
Memory Confidence, Vividness and Detail.  At both pre- and post- tests (see below) participants 
were asked to rate their confidence, vividness and detail of their memory for the most recent 
check on 100 point scales.  Participants were told that a score of 0 represents “not at all” and that 
a score of 100 represents “extremely.” 
 
Confidence in outcome.  At both pre- and post- tests (see below) participants were asked to 
indicate how confident they were (on a 0 to 100 scale) that all of the knobs were indeed off. 
 
‘Remember’ vs. ‘know’.  At both pre- and post-tests, participants were asked to indicate whether 
their memory for the most recent trial was consistent with ‘remembering’ the event, or just 
‘knowing’ that it happened.  A description of the distinction was provided to them consistent 
with that proposed by Tulving (1985).  Participants were told that: 
“Knowing” that the knobs are all off means that you have a general sense that they are off.  Even 
if you do not have a concrete memory, you just know they are turned off.  For example, your 
memory of tying your shoes this morning is probably ‘known’ as opposed to ‘remembered’. 
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“Remembering” that the knobs are turned off means you can go through your memory and bring 
up a memory of the act (with specific features) of turning them off.  For example, your memory 
of finding the lab in this building is probably ‘remembered’ as opposed to just ‘known’. 
 
Participants 
 Fifty-five undergraduate students from Concordia University participated in individual 
experimental sessions, although only fifty (9 males and 41 females) were included in the 
analyses (see below).  Participation for this study was on a voluntary basis and participants were 
offered a non-alcoholic beverage as compensation for their time.  On average, participants were 
25.32 (SD = 7.47) years old and ranged in age from 19-49 years.  Scores on self-report measures 
were all within the normal range and are displayed in Table 1. 
 
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually in the laboratory’s fully equipped kitchenette.  
Participants were randomly assigned to be trained on either the stove followed by the sink or the 
sink followed by the stove.  All participants were trained to “open/turn-on”, “close/turn-off” and 
“check” both the complete set of knobs on the stove and the knobs and faucet on the sink in a 
standardized, ritualized fashion.  The stove used in this study was an electric stove.  Throughout 
the training and testing on the stove, all of the plastic stove knobs were removed from the stove 
and participants were given one plastic knob which they were asked to use to operate all stove 
burners in the study.  Furthermore, the burner lights on the stove were covered up so that there 
were no visual cues that could help participants to determine whether or not the stove was 
completely off following each check.  Knobs on the stove were numbered one through six and 
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the sink components and knobs were referred to as “hot” (to be set either to half or full), “cold” 
(to be set either to half or full) or the “tap” (to be set either to the left or to the right).  Posted on 
the wall next to the stove was a diagram clearly indicating each stove knob by number to ensure 
that participants understood which number corresponded to which knob.  During pilot testing, 
participants reported that the two sets of tasks (involving turning and wiggling the stove knobs or 
faucet in a standardized way) were equally difficult.  The kitchen was dimly lit with the lighting 
fixed only on the stove and the sink.  One participant was excluded from the study after stating 
that they did not understand the training provided and another was excluded because of 
difficulties with the English language. 
Following the training phase and in order to increase perceived responsibility, 
participants were told that they would be left in the kitchenette by themselves for the next part of 
the study, and that communication with the experimenter would take place over an intercom 
affixed to a side wall in the kitchenette.  After each instruction provided (“open/turn-on”, 
“close/turn-off” or “check”), participants were asked to walk back to the intercom to let the 
experimenter know that they had completed the task.  
Once the participants were alone in the kitchenette, they were asked first to “turn-on”, 
then “turn-off” and finally to “check” a set of three knobs on the stove according to the 
procedures that they had just learned.  After these three tasks were completed, participants were 
guided out of the kitchen into a testing room where they provided pre-test ratings assessing 
memory confidence, vividness, and detail as well as a question to assess their memory accuracy 
(specifically, “which three knobs did you check?”), and a question about memory source 
(‘remember’ vs. ‘know’).  Participants scoring lower than 25 on any metamemory rating were 
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excluded to ensure that following one trial, all participants had sufficient metamemory to recall 
their experiences clearly.  (One participant was excluded for this reason.) 
Next, participants were randomly assigned to either complete 19 sets of additional trials 
on the stove (relevant checking condition) or 19 sets of trials on the sink (irrelevant checking 
condition).  Each trial was defined as including “turn-on”, “turn-off” and “check” instructions 
given for a randomized set of three knobs or sink elements (e.g., “Please turn on knobs 2, 3 and 
5.”; “Please turn them off.”; “Please check them.”; “Please turn on the cold water to half way, 
the hot water to full and turn the faucet to the left.”; “Please close them.”; etc.).  Following each 
instruction, the experimenter waited for the participant to complete each task before moving on 
to the next one.  There were two randomized orderings of 19 sets of three knobs and two 
randomized orderings of 19 sets of three kitchen sink operations that were used to provide 
instructions to participants about which knobs or which aspects of the kitchen sink should be 
used.  This was followed by a post-trial on the stove for all participants.  All participants were 
then again guided to a testing room where they were asked to complete a post-test assessing 
memory and metamemory for this last trial on the stove, identical to the pre-test, but this time, 
specifically asking about their most recent (final) check of the stove.  One participant was 
excluded from the relevant checking condition because the experimenters did not hear the 
participant checking the stove.  (Stove checking produced audible ‘clicks’ which were easy to 
hear through a covered observation window.) 
Lastly, all participants were asked to complete a questionnaire package including self-
report measures of symptoms of OCD (VOCI, Thordarson, et al., 2004), depression (BDI, Beck, 
Steer & Garbin, 1996) and anxiety (BAI, Beck & Steer, 1990).  One participant was excluded 




        
  Mean comparisons of the scores on the questionnaires revealed no significant differences 
between conditions (all p’s > .05), indicating acceptable random assignment.  The questionnaires 
were therefore not included in the analyses as covariates.  Means for the questionnaires, 
including the VOCI checking subscale, are included in Table 1.  Finally, there were no 
significant differences in age or gender across groups. 
 
Memory & Metamemory 
Memory accuracy and metamemory results are presented in Table 2 and Figure 1. 
 
Memory Accuracy 
Memory accuracy was assessed by scoring the number of correct responses to the 
question, “On the last checking trial you completed, which three knobs did you check?”.  
Accuracy was extremely high for both conditions at pre- and post-tests.  At pre-test, three 
relevant and two irrelevant checking participants remembered all but one knob correctly whereas 
all other participants had perfect accuracy scores.  At post-test, there were five relevant checking 
participants who remembered all but one knob correctly, whereas all participants in the irrelevant 
condition obtained a perfect score.  A 2x2 repeated measures ANOVA revealed that there were 
no significant changes in memory accuracy from pre- to post-test, F(1,48)<1, n.s., no significant 
differences in memory between the two conditions, although a trend towards reduced memory 
accuracy in the relevant checking condition was found, F(1,48)=3.72, p<0.10, and no significant 
interaction between time and condition F(1,48)=2.00, n.s.  Because of the memory accuracy trend, 
and because all participants in the irrelevant checking condition obtained a perfect memory score 
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at post-test, a follow-up Z-test was conducted and revealed that the relevant checking condition 
indeed showed a memory score that was significantly less than perfect (i.e., less than 3.0) at post-
test, Z=2.44, p<0.05, although the size of the post-test difference between conditions (a mean 
difference of 0.2 out of 3.0) was small. 
 
Memory confidence, vividness and detail 
A 2x2 repeated measures MANOVA with confidence, vividness and detail as dependant 
variables, revealed that measures of metamemory significantly decreased from pre-test to post-
test, F(1,48)=12.87, p<0.001, but that this change was moderated by a significant interaction 
between time and condition, F(1,48)=8.55, p<0.005.  Planned comparisons between conditions at 
post-test, correcting for unequal variances where appropriate, revealed that the relevant checking 
condition reported significantly less confidence in memory t(25.43)=3.25, p<0.003, significantly 
less memory vividness t(29.07)=3.47, p<0.002, and significantly less detail in memory t(39.57)=3.14, 
p<0.003, than the irrelevant checking condition.  There were no significant differences between 
conditions on any metamemory variable at pre-test, all p’s>0.05. 
 
Confidence in outcome 
A 2x2 repeated measures ANOVA revealed that there were no significant main effects 
for group, F(1,48)<1, for time F(1,48)=1.58, n.s. or for the interaction between group and time 
F(1,48)=1.32, n.s., indicating that participants were generally highly confident that all stove knobs 
had indeed been correctly turned off at pre- and post-test, regardless of condition. 
 
‘Remember’ vs. ‘know’ 
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 A frequency chart of remember and know responses at post-test by condition is displayed 
in Figure 2.  While there were no differences between groups in the frequency of remember vs. 
no responses at pre-test χ2(1)=1.22, n.s., at post-test, significantly more participants in the relevant 
checking condition reported only ‘knowing’ which knobs they checked, compared with the 
irrelevant checking condition, in which participants primarily ‘remembered’ which knobs they 
checked χ2(1)=4.16, p<0.05.  That is, the source and quality of memory were generally reduced in 




The results of the current investigation demonstrate that repeated relevant checking does 
indeed lead to memory distrust.  That is, when participants were asked to repeatedly check a 
stove, their memory confidence, vividness and detail significantly declined both compared to 
pre-test scores following only one check of the stove, and compared to a group of participants 
who were asked to engage in repeated irrelevant checking of a kitchen faucet.  These results are 
consistent with the findings of van den Hout & Kindt (2003, 2004), and lead one to conclude that 
the incorporation of elevated threat (both in terms of probability and severity of harm) as well as 
conditions that promote increased responsibility do not inhibit the significant declines in 
metamemory (confidence, vividness and detail) following repeated relevant checking. 
Interestingly, the results suggest that repeated relevant checking under ecologically valid 
conditions may produce very small but significant declines in memory accuracy.  While this 
contradicts the findings of van den Hout & Kindt (2003, 2004), and may not be consistent with 
previous findings of memory bias in OCD (Radomsky & Rachman, 1999; Radomsky, Rachman 
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& Hammond, 2001), it raises a set of interesting questions about the relationships between 
memory and metamemory in association with this particular task.  It could be that the 
significance of the difference in memory accuracy scores is simply amplified by the complete 
absence of variance in the perfect scores obtained by all participants in the irrelevant checking 
group.  However, it could be that repeated checking under conditions that were designed to 
promote high perceived responsibility and threat perceptions results in not only memory distrust, 
but also in slight decrements in memory accuracy.  Furthermore, if repeated checking in this 
paradigm does indeed lead to small reductions in memory accuracy, it would be interesting to 
learn what specific psychological and/or environmental factors contribute to these reductions.   
It should also be noted that the reductions in metamemory found in the current 
investigation appear to be less robust than those found by van den Hout and Kindt (2003, 2004).  
This could well be accounted for by the fact that completing checks of virtual objects is certainly 
less of a vivid and detailed experience than completing checks of real objects in an actual 
kitchen.  Van den Hout and Kindt (2003, 2004) proposed that repeated checking promotes a shift 
from primarily perceptual processing that occurs during early checks to primarily conceptual 
processing that occurs after repeated checks.  This shift is hypothesized to reduce memory 
vividness and detail, which in turn reduce memory confidence.  Given that an in vivo checking 
task likely provides a richer encoding environment with much more information to perceive than 
in a virtual checking task, it would be expected that reductions in these aspects of metamemory 
would likely be much slower.  It could also be argued however that increases in perceived threat 
and responsibility could contribute to greater reductions in metamemory, but it is proposed that 
rather, they would likely contribute to increased urges to check in a clinical sample.  These are 
empirical questions and would benefit from replication and further investigation. 
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Of course, there are some limitations to the current experimental investigation.  In this 
study, all irrelevant checking was conducted on the sink and all relevant checking was carried 
out on the stove.  Without continued checking, both objects would require a fairly long wait in 
the lab in order to determine that they were indeed properly shut off (for the stove, to wait until 
the burners cooled down and for the sink, to wait to ensure that there were no slow leaks), but 
there are fundamental differences about the nature of the threats presented by each object and 
this could be confounded with the relevant vs. irrelevant checking conditions in this 
investigation.  While it might be interesting to counterbalance this in a subsequent study, we 
chose not to, partially due to considerations of power and also because van den Hout & Kindt 
(2003) did counterbalance their relevant and irrelevant checking conditions in at least one study 
and found no differences between the metamemory of participants who engaged in relevant stove 
checking and those who engaged in relevant light bulb checking.  As such, it is highly unlikely 
that this addition would have produced a different pattern of results.  However, it would be quite 
interesting to investigate the differences between repeated checking of something that could 
indeed lead to some kind of disaster occurring (e.g., a functioning electric stove) and repeated 
checking of something that could not (e.g., an electric stove that was not plugged in to the 
electrical outlet). 
In addition, no measures of perceived threat or perceived responsibility associated with 
the task were taken during the experiment.  While it would certainly be interesting and useful to 
do this, we are confident that even though there were some factors that may have resulted in less 
than maximal perceived threat and responsibility (e.g., an experimenter in the next room), 
perceived threat and responsibility in this investigation were almost certainly higher than what 
would have been the case in a virtual checking task where there were obviously no real 
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consequences of checking improperly.  Furthermore, the heat generated by the stove burners and 
the fact that participants were completely alone and unobserved while checking in the testing 
room would almost certainly have elevated perceived threat and responsibility associated with 
the experimental task. 
One particularly interesting observation made during the testing of participants was the 
amount of frustration they appeared to display during the protocol.  Several participants asked 
the experimenter to tell them how many more checks there would be in both the relevant and 
irrelevant checking conditions.  (We provided a standardized response that they were doing well, 
but that we couldn’t tell them for how much longer they would be checking.)  During debriefing, 
other participants described the experiment as both “frustrating” and “annoying”.  While patients 
who engage in compulsive checking often report frustration with their rituals, their primary 
emotion during checking is more likely to be anxiety.  In future investigations of this type, it 
would be interesting and useful to assess frustration and anger in the context of repeated 
checking to ascertain the effects of checking on a variety of emotional experiences. 
The results of this investigation help to shed light on the self-perpetuating mechanism 
proposed by Rachman (2002) in a recent cognitive model of compulsive checking.  It appears as 
if mere repetition in the presence of perceived responsibility and perceived threat has dramatic 
effects on metamemory and possibly subtle effects on memory accuracy.  While this finding 
does not speak to the possible influences of repetition on perceived responsibility, seriousness of 
harm and probability of harm, it does demonstrate the effects of these multipliers (Rachman, 
2002) and repetition on confidence and other metamemory variables associated with the final 
state of the checked object.  While clinicians have known for years that checking behaviour is 
counterproductive, there is now some empirical evidence for why it is counterproductive.  It 
 17
leads to memory distrust – the very thing it is hoped to diminish.  This in turn promotes 
continued and/or renewed checking, paradoxically leading to even less memory confidence, 
vividness and detail. 
These initial findings lead one to speculate about possible factors that might be involved 
in the mechanism(s) associated with these reductions in metamemory.  Other experimental 
investigations examining attention focus during repeated checking, the amount of checking 
necessary to produce significant metamemory decreases and possible treatment components that 
could attenuate these decreases are currently underway and should lead to additional information 
about the processes involved, as well as possible practical applications toward the treatment of 
compulsive checking.  There are of course, several clinical applications of the findings in the 
current investigation.  Psychoeducation about the effects of repeated checking would likely be 
very helpful in motivating patients to reduce their checking behaviour.  While it has been known 
for many years that exposure and response prevention can be an effective treatment for OCD 
(Meyer, 1966), the results of the current experiment show how response prevention might 
improve memory and memory confidence for checked objects.  Finally, the possibilities 
associated with behavioural experiments used in treatment designed to assess the impact of 
repetition on metamemory are considerable, and results from this experimental investigation will 
hopefully lead to the increased incorporation of such exercises in treatment. 
Finally, this study represents an effort to investigate cognitive phenomena associated with 
a specific manifestation of OCD, namely compulsive checking.  While similar phenomena may 
operate in other forms of OCD, such as repeated washing rituals, compulsive list-making or 
counting, the checking-specific nature of the experiment is consistent with a recent call for 
“subtype-specific research” made by members of the Obsessive-Compulsive Cognitions 
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Working Group (McKay, et al., 2004; Radomsky & Taylor, in press).  It is proposed that 
investigations exploring aspects of specific types of OCD, rather than OCD in general, will be 
most helpful in elucidating cognitive phenomena of particular importance to each symptom type.  
These investigations already have been particularly fruitful in the past and have led to the 
development of specific cognitive-behavioural models of obsessions (Rachman, 1997, 1998), 
compulsive hoarding (Frost & Hartl, 1996), compulsive checking (Rachman, 2002), and most 
recently of compulsive cleaning and washing (Rachman, 2004).  It is proposed that experimental 
investigations of specific manifestations of OCD will be most fruitful in elucidating important 
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Table 1 - Participant Characteristics 
 
Condition VOCItotal VOCIcheck BAI BDI 





































Table 2 – Memory and metamemory pre- and post- repeated checking 






















(0.33) (0.00) (0.41) 
Confidence in memory of specific knobs checked  97.16 95.28 98.16 80.00 
in most recent trial (6.29) 
 
(9.85) (4.75) (27.54) 
Vividness of memory for most recent trial 96.12 89.56 94.56 74.00 
(6.62) 
 
(16.30) (9.21) (28.17) 
Detail in memory for most recent trial 94.20 89.28 89.56 69.00 
(10.28) 
 
(18.54) (16.99) (27.99) 
Confidence that all knobs are off 96.00 96.52 97.80 96.60 










































































































Figure 2 – Number of participants reporting ‘Remember’ vs. ‘Know’ at Post-Test 
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